Putin in Syria is just like Putin in Ukraine

Even before Russia started bombing targets in Syria, it should have been clear to all involved that its actions would follow the pattern President Vladimir Putin set in Ukraine.

He will be indiscriminately ruthless in making sure his allies achieve territorial gains to improve their negotiating position, and his diplomacy and propaganda machine will do its best to erect a smokescreen around his true plans and actions.

On Wednesday, the Federation Council, the upper house of Russia’s parliament, gave Putin permission to use troops overseas, an obligatory procedure under Russian law.

That’s also how the Crimea annexation began in March 2014, but there’s a striking difference between the two Federation Council resolutions.

Last year’s specifically permitted Putin to use the Russian military in Ukraine. Wednesday’s document is a blanket one.

It doesn’t mention Syria at all, granting the president the right to use “the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of the Russian Federation on the basis of commonly accepted principles and norms of international law.”

Putin isn’t bound by the decisions of his rubber-stamp parliament. He only uses the parliamentary procedure to strike fear into his enemies.

With this resolution, he is telling whomever it may concern that anything goes in his latest military adventure — including, implicitly, operations in countries neighboring Syria, such as Iraq.

Putin’s chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, and Federation Council speaker Valentina Matvienko said the matter only concerned Syria and that Russia would conduct only airstrikes there, ruling out the use of ground troops.

That means nothing. Putin wants, and has, full discretion in what he can do to aid Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

At the United Nations General Assembly on Monday, Putin talked about fighting the terrorist threat of the Islamic State, but he also made it clear that he, like Assad, saw little difference between the Islamic State and other anti-Assad groups fighting in Syria.

When it comes to fighting the enemy, the Kremlin doesn’t feel compelled to tell the truth.

To Putin the intelligence officer, obfuscation is an important weapon. Throughout the Ukraine crisis, Russia has denied the presence of its troops in eastern Ukraine and even pretended that it wasn’t arming the separatist rebels there.

Now, official Moscow is denying that the targets it is striking in Syria have nothing to do with the Islamic State.

Putin will do his best to help Assad recapture lost territory from whomever is holding it now, Islamic State or any other anti-Assad groups — and I wouldn’t rule out limited intervention by Russian ground troops if it becomes absolutely necessary.

He probably knows he can’t help Assad retake all of Syria. But together, Russia and Assad can recapture enough territory to negotiate a postwar settlement from a position of strength.

Putin’s goals are aligned with Assad’s for now, because he seeks to bolster his role; in talking to Assad, Western powers will be talking to Putin.

What the Syrian president may not realize is that once Putin comes in, it’s hard to get him out.

President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry would be naive if they didn’t understand all this after watching Putin in Ukraine for 18 months.

They are probably aware of all the implications of his interference.

If they’re not countering it more actively, it means they hope Putin’s interference will ultimately help end the war, something the U.S. has been unable to do, or they’re betting that Russia will overstretch itself and fail.

Both bets are extremely risky, but there are few alternatives.

As in Ukraine, stopping Putin would mean fighting him.

This story was originally published October 1, 2015 at 5:53 PM with the headline "Putin in Syria is just like Putin in Ukraine."